Abstract. The paper attempts to investigate the peculiarities of the national liberation movement of Western Ukrainians during the interwar period, when several social movements emerged, represented both as democratic unions and parties that carried out the legal struggle, as well as by two illegal political forces. Leading political forces tried to influence the national liberation, which did not lead to the consolidation of the community and further contradictions. Instead, the struggle of the Polish national chauvinists and Ukrainian patriotic forces did not allow Ukrainians to defend the sovereignty of their state, since this was affected by the military-political situation in the region, the position of the Entente countries, as well as the ethnic relations of the region. The development of the Ukrainian national liberation movement was perceived as antistate activity by the Polish society, and the unresolved political, economic, cultural, educational, and social problems -as an attempt to "steal" these lands. The Polish community considered the "Ukrainian question" through the prism of its own struggle for state independence and "groundless claims of Rusyns" to these territories. The consistent assimilation policy of the Polish authorities, the actual lack of unity of Ukrainian political forces pushed part of the Ukrainian youth to the use of more radical forms of struggle. In January 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was created in Vienna. The prevalence of national interests over individual ones was proclaimed, the supreme goal of the struggle was asserted by the achievement of state independence. Methods of struggle -propaganda, propaganda, sabotage and terrorist. Not only representatives of the occupation authorities, but also Ukrainians who did not share the ideology and methods of struggle of the OUN, were subjected to terror. Despite ideological sympathies or antipathies to the Ukrainian national idea, objectivity requires that the activities of legal parties and illegal influences significantly on the historical events of the twentieth century.
Aim of the research
The relevance of the topic of research in the stated chronological boundaries is that, despite a large number of published sources and scientific literature, there are many gaps in its study. In particular, there is a need to find out how specific forms and methods of counteracting state assimilation and the preservation of national identity appeared in Ukrainian society.
The main results of research in this area belong to Western Ukrainian researchers, in particular M. Kugutyak [1] , O. Krasovsky [2] , M. Lytvyn and K. Naumenko [3] , V. Marchuk [4] and many other domestic researchers who, with the use of a broad source base, in a comprehensive way highlighted the state-political, cultural and educational, socio-economic, spiritual life of Western Ukrainians.
A separate place in the study of leading political forces in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood was occupied by L. Zashkilnyak [5] , V. Khodak [6] , S. Vidyansky [7] , M. Mandryk, and others. The research of scientists accumulated the best traditions of both domestic and foreign historical science.
The purpose of the work is to analyze the components of the course of the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in the period 1918-1939.
Emergence of the liberation movement
In the 1920's, the ideological face of the Ukrainian liberation movement was still rather vague, so at this time it is impossible to talk about nationalist ideology, but only about the formation of a nationalist outlook.
In the 20-30's, Western-Ukrainian society witnessed radicalization of the national liberation movement with the use of terrorist acts.
Gradually, the most prominent factor in the social and political life of Western Ukraine was Ukrainian nationalism, whose birth is associated with a radical position in the struggle for Ukraine's state independence of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO), which in the future served as an "army in the underground". The UMO was a military patriotic, not a nationalist organization: it aimed to liberate Ukrainian lands from invaders by military means. Corresponding was its organizational structurelike the army. According to its organizers, the main task of the UMO was to prepare a nationwide uprising of the Ukrainian people against the invaders.
Starting from the spring of 1922, activists of the UMO began to carry out acts of sabotage in Galicia, burned bread storages, conducted armed attacks on gendarmes, blew up trains and bridges. In the 1920's, the UMO organized several assassinations of state officials.
In 1923-1924, UMO experienced a crisis, many activists and militants were in prison, a plan to spread sabotage and propaganda activities on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR failed, and the influence of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine increased. All these events somewhat undermined the credibility of the UMO. In order to consolidate nationalist and patriotic forces, the I Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists took place in Berlin in November 1927, which was attended by representatives of the UMO from the "Ukrainian Nationalist Youth Group" from Czechoslovakia (leader M. Konovalets), "The Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth" (Lviv) , "The Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists" of Czechoslovakia under the leadership of M. Sziborski. In Prague, on April 8-9, 1928, the II Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists took place. Discussing the problem of consolidation of the movement, its participants emphasized that it was necessary to form a unified organization on the basis of all-nation, supra-partisanship, monocracy and national dictatorship.
The nature of the UMO's activity, which positioned itself as a suprapartisanship secret non-mass military organization, whose main task was to continue the armed struggle with the occupier, did not contribute to the development of ideology. A certain role here was played by the disappointment of the military with all sorts of political programs and ideological platforms. Sufficient was the presence of a member of the organization's desire to fight for the liberation of Ukraine.
A clear ideological positioning of the UHF took place in the second half of the 1920's. It was accelerated by an acute discussion in the organization's rocks, caused by the emergence of Soviet-Philippine tendencies in it. In the end, this crisis was overcome: the Soviet -Filly membership of the UBO broke up, creating the Western-Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Organization, which advocated the expansion of the partisan movement in Poland, so that part of the youth joined the ranks. The rest of its members gradually leaned to a new one for Ukrainian politics and a popular nationalist ideology.
Then this ideology was just born -in numerous discussions in various youth circles, literary and cultural clubs. Therefore, it can be argued that the ideological platform of the liberation movement in this period was formed outside the clear organizational framework -at the level of personal outlook. The focus on the development of certain psychological features also determined the specifics of the ideological works of that time -most of them, filled with emotions, rather resemble religious sermons than political documents.
Among the causes of the defeat of the liberation struggle were also the psychological unwillingness of the Ukrainians to defend their freedom under the brutal conditions of the struggle. Therefore, in order to realize their state-building aspirations, Ukrainians would have to reburse: from the "soft, sentimental" to become "fanatically loyal soldiers". The radicalism of this requirement was sometimes even denied by the universal values inherent to people -compassion, morality, and the like. Obviously, these maximalist demands have never been fulfilled, but they have played an important role in shaping the psychological face of the movement's participants. For the first time in the Ukrainian history a generation of true revolutionariespeople separated from everyday life, whose life was entirely devoted to the struggle, arose.
Ukrainian National Democratic Union
In 1923-1927 there were significant changes in the social and political movement of Western Ukraine. Political parties reflected three orientations that dominated the then Polish society: pro-Soviet, pro-Polish, and self-determinant.
The most influential political association of Ukrainians was the Ukrainian National-Democratic Union (UNDU), the most massive legal Ukrainian party, formed in Lviv on July 11, 1925, with the Ukrainian People's Labor Party with all its factions, the Ukrainian National Work Party and the National a group of Ukrainian Parliamentary Representations with their associates from Volyn, Kholmshchyna, Polissya and Pidljashya. The head of the union was D. Levytsky, and from 1935 -V. Wise.
The association was based on Ukraine's self-determination without the use of terrorist methods. An agreement was reached between UNDU and the Polish government, where UNDU refused to fight for the autonomy of the Western Ukraine. At first, some of the members of the party relied on the peaceful evolution of the Ukrainian SSR to a national state, which was the result of a compromise between Soviet forces and supporters of the "orientation to their own forces". Until 1927, the UNDU considered the Ukrainian SSR as a sovereign state, which eventually would become completely independent, however, the struggle against the "national-deflection" in the Communist Party of Ukraine, the repression against the intelligentsia, and forced collectivization became an obstacle. From the late 20's, UNDU took hostile positions regarding the Soviet regime and laid the foundations for its overthrow through a revolutionary way. In the 1930's, the UNDU believed that the Ukrainian state would emerge from war due to the intervention of the Western powers. According to the leaders of UNDU, Western Ukraine should have become the base for the liberation of the Transdniestrian Ukraine from the power of Bolshevik Moscow. The search for a compromise with the Polish government on the anti-Soviet platform began. In 1932, the leadership of UNDU decided to temporarily refuse from the slogans of independence, replacing them at the request of the national-territorial autonomy for all Ukrainian lands in the Polish state. The anti-Ukrainian position of the Sejm leadership finally convinced Ukrainian parliamentarians of the futility of further attempts to settle themselves with the Polish circles. UNDU became an opposition to the Polish government. This led to the collapse of the UNDU and other legal parties.
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
The successive assimilation policies of Polish authorities, the lack of unity of Ukrainian political forces pushed part of the youth to the use of more radical forms of struggle. In January 1929, an Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was created in Vinnytsia. Its leader became E. Konovalets, and the main ideologist for a long time was D. Dontsov. On the eve of the Second World OUN had around 20 thousand members. Using tactics of terror and government sabotage, defining itself as a movement, and not as a party, the OUN condemned all the legitimate Ukrainian parties of Galicia as colloquialist. The OUN has committed dozens of state fund expropriations, over 60 attempts and assassinations.
As a matter of fact, among all political parties and organizations operating on the lands of subordinated Poland, it was the OUN's most active influence on the actual course of events and eventually left behind the most significant result in the history. Obviously, this was the response to the demands of the time when it became necessary to unite disparate nationalist organizations into a single structure based on a clear ideology. The OUN, unlike the UMO, from the outset acted as a political organization, and therefore had to ideologically oppose the existing political forces in order to prove its necessity.
OUN members carried out sabotage actions, attacked banks and mail. The political doctrine of the OUN was formulated in its program documents in 1929, and finally -in the program adopted by its Grand Meeting in 1939. The concept of "creative violence and the active minority as a leading force" was an integral part of ideology. The OUN's state concept was based on the assumption that the Ukrainian lands were occupied by Poland and the USSR. Therefore, Ukrainian nationalists did not recognize all those international acts, treaties and agreements, which separated the Ukrainian lands and endorsed Ukrainian statehood. The building of independent Ukraine should end with the complete expulsion of all occupiers from the Ukrainian lands. The first commandment of the OUN called: "You will win the Ukrainian state or you will die in the struggle for it". The attacks on Polish officials were particularly popular.
Student youth, students of higher and secondary educational establishments, were most fond of this movement. They began to unite, to create youth organizations standing on self-styled attitudes. The youth was disappointed in the older generation, which could not stand up to Ukrainian statehood. In addition, she suffered constant oppression by the Polish authorities, suffered from unemployment.
The OUN was a subsidiary organization. It issued legal and illegal newspapers and magazines ("National Development", "Surma", "Young"), adhered to military methods of leadership, had a rigidly centralized structure. At the same time, the OUN did not refuse to participate in political, economic, cultural and educational associations. It was because of them that it hoped to lead a massive national-liberation movement.
Accordingly, at this stage, the professionalization of ideologists takes place -in the structure of the OUN one of the leading places occupies a special ideological reference, a specialized edition "Building the Nation" appears (coming out in 1928), which became a platform for discussion of ideology issues. Since one of the main tasks of the liberation movement was the creation of a powerful consolidated organization as an instrument of the liberation struggle, considerable attention was paid to the education of membership. There were a number of specially designed requirements for members of the OUN (Decalogue, 12 attributes, 44 rules), which, in their form and content, somewhat resemble the codes of religious organizations. Incidentally, at this stage, the desire of the ideologues of the OUN to transform the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism into a kind of secular religion has led to an escalation of the OUN's relationship with the church and clerical organizations. In general, at this stage, the OUN leadership recognized the formation and popularization of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as one of the priority areas -along with the continuation of armed struggle against the invaders. Ideological and military schools become the basis of membership training. As in the previous period, a significant imprint on ideology left the fashion on authoritarian models of governance, a critical attitude to democratic principles both in ideology and in practice. The worldwide fashion for charismatic leaders was reflected in the Ukrainian leaders (Konovalets, later Bandera), in the creation of the cult of the heroic past.
The final chord for this stage was the split of the OUN in two, which, on the one hand, completed a long conflict within the organization, and on the other hand, it was the beginning of a new stage in the development of the ideological platform of a dynamic youth wing that took shape in 1940 under the leadership of Stepan Bandera.
Consequently, the conflict, in essence, has become an important catalyst for the development of nationalist ideology and its transition to a political program format. "Splitters", in order to gain membership support, to legitimize their actions, had to oppose the leadership of the then one organization more than personal claims to specific figures. In addition to the OUN, the emergence of a new organization, a new leadership opened the way for the younger generation of ideologists who could not be realized under the pressure of senior authorities.
The split also seriously affected authoritarian tendencies, which for a long time dominated the nationalist movement. Confrontation with a concrete manifestation of authoritarianism soon transformed into a confrontation with authoritarianism as a principle.
Legal Liberation Organizations in Western Ukraine
In addition to the OUN, less radical organizations acted on the territory of Western Ukraine, for example, the pro-Ukrainian political direction, which supported the idea of the unity of the Transcarpathians with the entire Ukrainian people. This course was headed by the leader of the Christian People's Party, the priest Augustine Voloshin, brothers Michael and Yuriy Braschayky. The Ukrainian people used the support of the Galician Intelligentsia. With their help, the centers of "Enlightenment", Scout organization "Plast", cooperatives, newspapers and magazines were created in the region.
An important link in the "legal sector" activity was the support and development of a network of Ukrainian public organizations: cultural, educational, economic, youth, sports, etc. their significance in the conditions of Polish occupation is difficult to reassess. Thus, the Society "Enlightenment", having rallied about half a million members, supported the activity of readers, published educational materials, conducted a number of courses. The "Union of Ukrainians", uniting 45 thousand Ukrainian women, carried out extensive philanthropy, education and cultural activities.
The Ridna School, with up to 100 thousand members, in contrast to the polonization of state education, has built up its own network of private Ukrainian schools, which in 1938 accounted for about 40 gymnasiums, lyceums and vocational schools. The youth organizations "Sokil", "Lug" (formerly "Sich"), "Plast" and others, which raised patriotism among their members and aspirations for state independence.
The Ukrainian cooperative movement, the essence of which was determined by the slogan "Stand on its own strength", achieved significant results. The largest of the cooperatives -"Butter Union", "Central Bank", "Peoples Trading", and others have deployed their branches throughout Galicia. Co-operation has given impetus to the introduction of new ways of managing among the Ukrainian peasantry, and has created conditions for the centralized sale of agricultural products, including abroad, ending the usurious debts of the Galician village, and contributed to the gradual improvement of the economic situation of its inhabitants. Taking into account 4000 cooperatives with a total of more than 700 thousand members in Galicia, the Ukrainian cooperative movement successfully competed with Polish, but also became a means of economic self-defense and self-government of the Western Ukrainian society.
An important factor in the liberation movement of the Galician Ukrainians was the Greek Catholic Church, whose national character was finally crystallized due to its head Metropolit A. Sheptytsky.
Protecting the interests of the oppressed people, he used his own strength, authority, and personal finances. He built high school, provided material assistance to private schools, was a generous philanthropist and a good connoisseur of Ukrainian art.
Thus, the "legal sector" of the Ukrainian liberation movement essentially covered all areas of national life -from the production of agricultural products to the development of scientific and cultural values.
Thanks to it, they managed to rebuild, first of all, the Halychyna territory, a strong civil society, which turned into a kind of "state in the state". Ukrainians, in spite of the discriminatory policy of the Polish authorities, managed not only to preserve the previous national conquests, but to some extent to multiply them.
Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in Volynia
The public-political life of pre-war Volynia was characterized by an intensification of inter-ethnic confrontation. The Polish government's implementation of a militant course aimed at assimilating Ukrainians led to a new breakthrough of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in the province. The most complete anti-Ukrainian views were formulated in the program of the Volynia governor G. Yuzevsky, whose main provisions were announced at the congress of governors in Lutsk on December 2-3, 1929, and agreed with Y. Pilsudski. An important element of this program was an attempt by the Polish government to artificially separate the ethnic Ukrainian lands in the Second Commonwealth. For this purpose, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complex of measures was taken to strengthen the artificial boundary, which separated the Volynia from the Galicia. During the first half of the 1930's, as a result of the implementation of government plans, the internal situation in Volynia became more acute, and Polish-Ukrainian relations became more complicated. This was due to the fact that during the specified period in the province the Polish authorities closed all branches of Prosvita, eliminated almost all Ukrainian cooperatives that were subject to the Revision Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives in Lviv, and instead they formed mixed Polish-Ukrainian economic structures subordinated to Warsaw, the activities of most Ukrainian schools were discontinued. Instead, the authorities tried to open Polish or mixed (Polish-Ukrainian) schools. As a result of such domestic policy, the Ukrainian majority of Volynia in the mid-1930's was virtually without national education. Another factor that negatively affected the Polish-Ukrainian relations was the government's policy of distributing lands to Polish colonists.
All this led to the fact that on the eve of the Second World War, the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in the province intensified, and anti-Ukrainian accents in the domestic policy of the Polish governments strengthened. This activity of the Polish government set against itself not only the representatives of the Ukrainian political environment, the opposition to power, but also the part of those Ukrainian politicians who stood at the position of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation.
In declaring the need for Polish-Ukrainian understanding and covering behind the slogans of "cohabitation" and "cooperation", practically did everything in order to separate the Ukrainian ethnic territory within Poland and to implement the policy of colonization of Western Ukrainian lands. The government attached importance to the implementation of Poland's domestic policy in the occupied lands by combating Orthodoxy as the basis of the national consciousness of Ukrainians.
Thus, the government's policy of distributing lands to Polish colonists, which lasted in Volynia and during the 1930s, has become one of the factors that has aggravated inter-ethnic confrontation. An important factor in the colonization of Ukrainian lands by the Polish governments was not only the desire to grant the former Polish military land plots: the Polish colonists were also assigned the task of promoting the assimilation of the local population. Taking into account that in the rural areas of Volynia the predominance of Ukrainians was evident, the increase in the number of Polish settlers created the conditions under which the Poles were able to reserve their posts in local self-government bodies and thus control the activities of rural communities.
To autonomize the political and social life in Volynia, Polish officials, tried to prevent the distribution of Ukrainian periodicals among the Ukrainian population. The first of these bans fell on Ukrainian calendars, at that time very popular among the Ukrainian population. During 1936-1937, in some provinces of Volynia, the police arrested the distributors of Ukrainian calendars and confiscated their calendars without any reason. A little later, having not achieved the desired result, the Polish administrative authorities decided to prevent the release of Volyn Ukrainian periodicals published in Galicia.
According to the documents of the Polish security forces, this was done on the initiative of the Volyn governor, who thus tried to protect the land from the "harmful" influences of Galicia.
However, despite attempts by Poland to take measures aimed at the information blockade of Volynia, anti-colonial publications disseminated by activists of Ukrainian political structures remained a form of counteraction to the policy of colonizing Ukrainian lands by Poles.
Against such activists, the Polish authorities often used force methods, arresting and imprisoning them. For example, April 13, 1937, the case of M. Vashchyshyn was considered at the Rivne District Court, whщ circulated anti-colonial publications of UNDГ. Rivne city court accused him of spreading "false" information about the implementation of the Polish government colonization plans, according to which during the colonization, the authorities took the land from Ukrainian peasants and gave the Polish settlers. At the time of the conviction in this case, the judge did not pay attention to the fact that all confiscated publications were legal and were subject to appropriate censorship. Consequently, when making sentences to distributors of Ukrainian newspapers, magazines and other literature issued outside of the province, the Volyn judges used laws that were not in force in the country, and the orders of the local administration, which tried to discourage the Ukrainian people from any desire to distribute "unnecessary" and "harmful" information.
During 1938-1939, control over the proliferation of Ukrainian periodicals intensified and the magazines stopped coming not only to kiosks or to individual citizens but also to party structures, in particular to the legal Ukrainian parties, with the exception of the pro-government Volyn Ukrainian Association (VUA).
Consequently, the internal policy of Polish government, aimed at the autonomy of public life in the land and the cessation of the activities of oppositional political groups, has not only failed to achieve its goal, but rather had a reciprocal effect. According to documents of that time, the Ukrainian population of Volynia did not reconcile with such a policy of power, on the contrary, the inter-ethnic confrontation in the province intensified.
Another factor that led to a new revolt of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in Volynia was the policy of forcible conversion of Orthodox to Catholics. Increasing pressure on Ukrainian society by the Polish government, and not only the civilian administration, was due to the fact that in the second half of the 1930s, Polish militaries played an increasingly important role in the political life of Volyn. Special hatred for Ukrainians was revealed by the Border Guard Corps (BGC). It was the BGC who destroyed the Ukrainian temples, and converted Orthodox Ukrainians to Catholics, often evicted them from the border strip.
In the beginning of 1938 B. Kozubsky, a member of the Central Committee of the UNU, received a request from the party's leadership to gather information about the compulsory conversion of the Orthodox to Catholics, which was carried out by the BGC in the border counties. The data obtained was planned to be used in the country's parliament, as such actions contradicted the constitutional rights of Polish citizens.
In addition to the conversion of Orthodox to Catholics, in the border counties the BGC set various restrictions for Ukrainians that concerned not only the possibilities of free movement, but also the activities of Ukrainian structures. Public life in these lands was managed not so much by the representatives of the local administration, but by the Polish military.
Consequently, representatives of Ukrainian political structures tried to counteract the reverberative action of the Polish authorities and opposed the restrictions on the Ukrainian national movement that existed in the border regions with the USSR through the domination of the representatives of the BGC who terrorized Ukrainians in the border counties of Volynia. Representatives of the Polish military played a major role in the life of the frontier counties and had much more levers of influence on all spheres of public life than representatives of the local civilian administration. In this regard, the border counties acted not depending on national laws, but on the orders of the command of the BGC. Protests by members of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation (UPR) against this situation in the border zone did not produce the desired result.
The authorities continued to encourage anti-Ukrainian military activities, giving the latter more and more powers. At the same time, in the middle of the 1920's, Polish border troops settled mainly in the border counties, whose task was not only to promote polonization of the region but also to counteract the illegal crossing of the Polish-Soviet border.
In the military plans of "Strengthening the Polish character" of the eastern provinces of the state, it was emphasized that in Volynia the national policy towards the Ukrainians of the region should be aimed at their state assimilation.
This activity of the Polish government caused a harsh confrontation between radical Ukrainian political groups. Taking G. Yuzevsky's direct blame for discrimination against the Ukrainian population of Volyn, members of the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the mid-1930's began preparing an assassination attempt on the Volyn governor G. Yuzevsky, which they planned to carry out in 1936. But the plan was not implemented by the members of the organization, as the police arrested many members of the OUN. The case of preparing an assassination attempt on the Volyn governor received a broad resonance.
As the investigation revealed, preparations for an assassination commenced in 1934, and O. Kutz, a student of the Ukrainian grammar school in Lutsk, a member of the county executive office of the OUN, was responsible for its execution. O. Kuts explained the reasons for joining the OUN in 1933 by the fact that he wanted to fight communism, which was spreading among Ukrainian youth. The lawyer of the defendant S. Shukhevych tried to draw the attention of the judges to the point that O. Kuts attempted, by belonging to the OUN, to oppose himself to communism, and by way of passive resistance, it was impossible to carry out an assassination attempt on the governor. O. Kuts was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment and 10 years deprivation of his rights. The fact that the assassination attempt on G. Yuzevsky was planned by the OUN was confirmed in the Lviv process against the leadership of the OUN in the 1936 where O. Kuts acted as a witness. In this process of the planned assassination attempt on G. Yuzevsky, S. Bandera, referring to the reasons for the preparation of the assassination, explained that it was stimulated by the assimilation policy of the Volyn governor G. Yuzevsky. This position of the members of the nationalist underground was dictated by the fact that the activity of the governors, in their opinion, hurt the Ukrainian population of the region, and its internal policy was directed at the separation of Volyn from Galicia because G. Yuzevsky prohibited the distribution of Ukrainian periodicals even legally issued in Galicia in Volynia.
Therefore, part of the right-wing radical-minded Ukrainian politicians planned to use force methods in the struggle against Polish chauvinistic politics, not excluding the acts of political terror against prominent figures of the Polish administration.
Thus, during the second half of the 1930's, Ukrainian-Polish relations in the Volhynia were in a state of confrontation. Their complication was caused by the domestic policy of Polish governments aimed at discriminating against Ukrainians in all spheres of socio-political, religious and economic life.
Conclusions
The national liberation movement of Ukrainians against the policy of the Polish authorities was manifested both in legal and illegal forms of struggle for their rights.
In 1925, Ukrainians in Poland had 12 political parties that represented a very broad political spectrum. Among them, the most influential are:
1) The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDU) is a centrist-oriented party that was oriented towards Ukraine's independence and democratic development.
2) Ukrainian Social-Radical Party (USRP), which sought to combine the principles of democratic socialism with the national revival of Ukraine.
At the opposite pole, there were political associations of the Ukrainian Catholic Party type that were weak and inclined to cooperate with the Polish government. Ukrainian parties fought unsuccessfully for seats in the Polish parliament: if in November 1927 the representation of Ukrainians in the Sejm consisted of 25 ambassadors and 6 senators, then in July 1930 it increased to 50 ambassadors and 14 senators. Although there was no unity among Ukrainian parliamentarians, the Ukrainian parliamentary representation was an important and influential factor in political life.
In the economy, the opposition to the official line to inhibition of the development of Ukrainian lands was carried out through a cooperative movement. At this time, the expansion of the functions of cooperatives took place, the cooperative movement began to consider itself as an instrument of self-government and economic self-defense. Obviously, this is precisely why Ukrainian co-operation is intensively developing under severe economic pressure.
The Greek Catholic Church had a significant influence on the activity of the Ukrainian population. Her head, Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky, opposed the annexation of Ukrainian lands to Poland. In 1923 A. Sheptytsky was arrested.
The consistent assimilation policy of the Polish authorities, the actual lack of unity of Ukrainian political forces pushed part of the Ukrainian youth to the use of more radical forms of struggle. In January 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was created in Vienna. Its leader became E. Konovalets. The prevalence of national interests over individual ones was proclaimed, the supreme goal of the struggle was asserted by the achievement of state independence. Methods of struggle -propaganda, sab-otage and terrorist. Not only representatives of the occupation authorities, but also Ukrainians who did not share the ideology and methods of struggle of the OUN, were subjected to terror.
